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Last year farmers received $746 million in net crop in-surance payments. But the 
program cost taxpayers approxi-
mately $2.5 billion, or $3.31 for 
each dollar paid out. Since 2001, 
when the provisions of the Agricul-
tural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) 
fully came into force, taxpayers 
have paid $15.1 billion to deliver 
$8.82 billion to farmers. This im-
balance between taxpayer costs 
and producer benefi ts has led 
some to question whether money 
allocated to crop insurance might 
be more effi ciently used elsewhere 
in USDA’s budget. For example, 
producers would have received all 
$15.1 billion if the funds had been 
sent out in the form of direct pay-
ments. Or, this $15.1 billion could 
support the Conservation Reserve 
Program for nine years. Or, of 
course, our national debt would be 
$15.1 billion smaller now without 
the program.
One diffi culty in evaluating 
whether crop insurance funds are 
being used effi ciently is the com-
plex nature of the program. Simply 
put, relatively few people outside 
the industry really understand 
how the program works and what 
is being supported by taxpayer 
funds. In order to make a judg-
ment about the program’s relative 
merits, fi rst we need to understand 
why it costs $15.1 billion to deliver 
$8.82 billion to farmers.
A Public-Private Partnership
The U.S. crop insurance pro-
gram is funded by taxpayers, 
regulated by USDA’s Risk Manage-
ment Agency (RMA), but sold and 
serviced by private business. There 
are economic and historical reasons 
why the program is neither all public 
nor all private. 
The private sector is good at 
developing insurance markets when 
the insured risks have the attribute 
that the premiums from the many 
will cover the losses of the few every 
year. Examples include fi re losses, 
loss of life, and crop damage from 
hail. In any year, total insurance 
losses are fairly predictable, so pre-
miums can be set to allow insurance 
companies to make a predictable 
rate of return. 
The private sector is reluctant 
to offer insurance when insurance 
claims vary dramatically from year 
to year. Examples include fl oods, 
hurricanes, and crop losses due to 
droughts. When these events occur, 
annual premiums cannot cover loss-
es, and bankruptcy for the insuring 
company is a real possibility. Most 
researchers have concluded that a 
purely private crop insurance market 
would not exist because the risks are 
too large. Thus, if we want to have 
a crop insurance program, then we 
must have some degree of public sec-
tor involvement in providing back-
stop protection in large-loss years.
From Congress’s perspective, the 
purpose of the crop insurance pro-
gram is to reduce the need for annual 
declarations of agricultural disasters, 
with subsequent emergency spend-
ing bills. This objective will only be 
met if crop insurance is widely avail-
able and widely purchased. Begin-
ning in 1980, Congress has passed 
a series of crop insurance reform 
packages designed to expand the 
program, primarily by giving large 
incentives to the private sector to 
make insurance widely available and 
to farmers to buy the product. With 
ARPA, crop insurance is available 
to nearly all crops, and the propor-
tion of crop acreage that is insured is 
approximately 80 percent. But now 
that Congress has accomplished its 
objective, are the benefi ts from the 
program worth the costs? The last 
three columns of Table 1 (p. 3) show 
the three categories of taxpayer 
costs during the ARPA period. The 
fi rst three columns show how the 
program has grown under ARPA.
Producer Premium Subsidies
Farmers must pay for crop insur-
ance, but they pay only a portion of 
the amount needed to cover insured 
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losses. Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, farmers were reluctant to buy 
enough crop insurance to satisfy 
Congress. So to get farmers to buy 
more insurance, ARPA dramatically 
decreased the portion that farmers 
must pay. Currently, farmers pay 
about 41 percent of the amount need-
ed to cover insured losses. This large 
subsidy means that most farmers will 
get substantially more back from the 
program than they pay into it. 
It is somewhat of a paradox why 
farmers require such large subsidies 
to buy a product that substantially 
reduces their fi nancial risk. But farm-
ers routinely reduce fi nancial risk 
in a number of other ways. Growing 
more than a single crop, raising live-
stock, working off-farm, employing 
marketing tools, and adopting risk-
reducing management practices—all 
work to reduce fi nancial vulnerabil-
ity. In addition, for the lowest-risk 
farmers, the price of crop insurance 
may not adequately refl ect their risk. 
So one explanation for this paradox 
is that for many farmers, the amount 
of remaining fi nancial risk they face 
may simply be too small to insure 
unless the price of insurance is low 
enough. The current 59 percent aver-
age subsidy seems to have reduced 
the price of insurance to the point 
where most farmers now consider it 
worthwhile to purchase. This premi-
um subsidy is now so large that the 
average farmer in the program can 
expect a rate of return on the pro-
ducer paid premium of 143 percent.
Administrative and 
Operating Subsidies
It costs money to deliver crop insur-
ance. Company salaries must be 
paid. Agent commissions must be 
paid. Loss claims must be verifi ed 
and paid. And regulatory require-
ments must be met. In 1980, Con-
gress decided that delivery of the 
crop insurance program should be 
given to the private sector so that 
the program could be expanded as 
rapidly as possible. Companies had 
an incentive to expand sales be-
cause they were essentially paid a 
sales commission. For each dollar of 
premium they brought in, companies 
were given a percentage. Currently 
companies are paid A&O (administra-
tive and operating) subsidies equal 
to about 21.5 percent of the premium. 
With $4 billion in premiums, this 
amounts to approximately $840 mil-
lion in subsidies.
The A&O percent subsidy has 
fallen steadily over the last 10 years 
from 31 percent in 1997. But this does 
not mean that companies are getting 
by on less total reimbursement. In 
1997, total premiums were $1.7 bil-
lion. By 2005, total premiums were 
$3.95 billion. So A&O subsidies have 
increased by 60 percent since 1997 
even though insured acreage has in-
creased by only 35 percent. 
The largest expense covered by 
A&O is agent commissions. Com-
missions vary dramatically across 
agents depending on how attractive 
an agent’s customers are to a com-
pany. Some agents are paid up to 20 
percent (or more) for each dollar of 
premium they bring to a company. It 
seems odd that farmers still need to 
be convinced by commission-based 
agents that they need to buy crop in-
surance. The program is now so well 
known and the premium subsidies 
are so large that perhaps Congress 
can fi nally declare success at meet-
ing its 1980 expansion objective and 
begin to change the program.
Net Underwriting Gains
Crop insurance companies do not 
live on A&O subsidies alone. In years 
in which premiums exceed insurance 
claims, companies get to keep a por-
tion of the difference, which is known 
as an underwriting gain. For example, 
in 2004, premiums exceeded claims 
by $979 million. Companies were al-
lowed to keep $848 million of this dif-
ference. In years in which premiums 
are less than insurance claims, com-
panies may have to pay a portion of 
the difference, an underwriting loss. 
In 2002, for example, claims exceeded 
premiums by $1.15 billion. Compa-
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nies had to pay the government $52 
million of this amount. 
The 2002 and 2004 examples 
nicely illustrate why, on average, 
crop insurance companies generate 
additional funding for their activi-
ties. In years in which underwriting 
gains are positive, companies get to 
keep a larger proportion of the gain 
than they have to pay the govern-
ment in years in which there are 
underwriting losses. The mechanism 
by which net gains and losses are 
determined is the Standard Reinsur-
ance Agreement (SRA). 
Companies generate net gains 
from the SRA in two ways. The fi rst 
is by determining which of their cus-
tomers are most likely to generate 
claims and then giving the premium 
from these customers and respon-
sibility for any subsequent losses 
directly to the government. The aver-
age customer retained by a company 
therefore has a better risk profi le 
than the average customer in the 
overall pool. Thus, average claims 
from the retained pool will be lower 
than the overall average, and the 
company will tend to make money.
However, the overall risk of loss 
from retained customers is still too 
large for companies to be willing to 
take on all losses. Hence the SRA is 
designed to have the government 
take on a portion of company losses 
when claims exceed premiums in 
exchange for companies giving the 
government some of their gains 
when premiums exceed claims. In 
essence, in exchange for companies 
taking on some of the risk of the 
crop insurance program, the gov-
ernment is allowing companies to 
generate some gains.
Table 2 summarizes estimates of 
the potential gains and losses to pri-
vate crop insurance companies from 
operation of the current SRA. These 
estimates are based on loss experi-
ence from 1993 to 2005.  The table 
presents four equally likely scenarios 
regarding crop insurance claims. As 
shown, we estimate that with $4 bil-
lion in premiums, companies should 
expect to make $435 million per year 
in net underwriting gains. 
The fi rst justifi cation for these 
gains is to compensate companies for 
the risk that they retain. Note that in 
the high-loss scenario, we estimate 
that private companies would lose an 
average of $223 million. Companies 
routinely argue that they need com-
pensation for taking this risk away 
from the government. The price to 
taxpayers for companies taking this 
loss 25 percent of the time is the aver-
age gain that the companies receive 
75 percent of the time, which amounts 
to $654 million. Clearly, the price gov-
ernment pays to induce companies to 
share risk is quite high.
The second justifi cation often 
given for these gains is to com-
pensate companies for the USDA 
requirement that all eligible farm-
ers must be offered crop insurance. 
This means that companies cannot 
easily choose to whom they can sell 
insurance. But, the SRA provision 
that allows companies to transfer 
premiums and losses from their 
high-risk customers directly to the 
government seems like adequate 
compensation for this requirement.
 
Policy Choices
Since 1980 Congress has made ex-
pansion of crop insurance a con-
sistent priority. To a large degree, 
ARPA has fi nally allowed Congress 
to achieve this objective. The cost 
is high, however. Program costs 
could be reduced if the mecha-
nisms that Congress and USDA have 
implemented to succeed in this 
Table 2. Potential gains and losses to crop insurance companies under 
the Standard Reinsurance Agreement
Continued on page 10
Table 1. U.S. crop insurance program coverage, premiums, and costs 
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In contrast to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
a successful Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations is likely to bring ma-
jor changes in international dairy 
markets. Some countries protect 
their domestic producers by using 
restrictive tariff rate quotas (TRQ) 
and high over-quota import duties. 
And large export subsidies allow the 
European Union and other countries 
to continue to export dairy products 
despite high internal price supports. 
The signifi cant tariff cuts and elimi-
nation of export subsidies currently 
proposed in the Doha negotiations 
would create notable shortages in 
international dairy markets in the 
near term. Rising world prices will 
undoubtedly generate a supply 
response in countries with histori-
cally strong dairy industries, such as 
New Zealand and Australia, but it is 
less clear which other countries will 
step up to fi ll the void created by the 
removal of subsidized products and 
meet market opportunities created 
by lower tariffs. Argentina and Chile 
are two potential benefi ciaries of a 
new WTO agreement. We review key 
fi ndings of a recent CARD study on 
these two countries’ dairy sectors 
and draw lessons for U.S. dairy.
Argentine Dairy: Strong but 
with Continuing Challenges
Argentina has a century-old tradition 
of dairy production. In 1999, Argen-
tina was 13th in global milk produc-
tion, right behind New Zealand. In 
that same year, Argentina was a major 
Global Prospects for Dairy in Argentina and Chile and 
Lessons for U.S. Dairy Industries
exporter of whole milk powder and 
a growing exporter of cheese. The 
economic crisis in 2001 prompted a 
severe contraction of dairy produc-
tion. The sector has emerged from 
the crisis as a viable industry with 
tremendous potential. 
Argentina has several critical 
assets that contribute to its competi-
tive advantage in milk production. 
First, feedstuffs are abundant and of 
high quality. Argentina’s primary milk 
producing regions co-exist geographi-
cally with its vast cropping regions, 
thereby assuring low feed costs. 
These regions have adequate land to 
facilitate both crop production and 
improved pasture, without intense 
competition. Second, Argentine dairy 
farmers have access to and use high-
quality genetic stock. Third, Argen-
tine dairy farms are generally well 
managed by experienced producers 
who can produce excellent quality 
milk. They have the infrastructure 
on the farms (automated milking and 
on-farm cold storage) to preserve the 
quality of the milk and to meet inter-
national standards for export. 
Argentina has a competitive 
processing sector dominated by a 
number of large fi rms with a clear 
export orientation. Many of the 
top fi rms have long been involved 
with export markets and have built 
brand recognition in foreign mar-
kets. Moreover, the connections 
between domestic fi rms and inter-
national partners, such as Nestlé, 
Fonterra, and Saputo, give Argen-
tine processors access to expanded 
marketing expertise abroad. These 
processors have proven they have 
the ability to meet international 
consumers’ demand for quality and 
product safety.
The road infrastructure in Ar-
gentina is excellent, even in remote 
areas. This is in sharp contrast to 
Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Chile. 
The transportation and communi-
cation infrastructures seem more 
than adequate to allow quick price 
discovery and easy communication 
between the processors and farm-
ers for sample test results and other 
marketing matters. Pricing incen-
tives are already in place to pay 
farmers for low bacteria counts, high 
fat, and high milk-solid content. 
Despite these advantages, 
Argentina’s dairy sector faces sig-
nifi cant challenges in expanding its 
production and exports. Since the 
fi nancial crisis, a great source of un-
certainty for investors in Argentina 
has been the instability of the Ar-
gentine currency and the threats of 
price control. The peso underwent 
a massive devaluation in 2002. The 
peso is now expected to appreciate 
in real terms against the U.S. dollar 
because of relatively high infl a-
tion in Argentina. Competitiveness 
based on the massive devaluation 
will be progressively eaten away by 
infl ation. Argentina’s domestic and 
trade policies add to the uncertain-
ty for dairy producers. Argentina 
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imposes a 15 percent export tax on 
most dairy products, handicapping 
the industry. Value-added-tax re-
funds on exports were eliminated as 
well after 2001. The government has 
a history of adjusting the export tax 
rate as international prices change, 
and this discretionary approach to 
taxation adds to the uncertainty of 
future profi tability for dairy produc-
ers and processors. 
The export tax raises govern-
ment revenues and lowers the cost 
of food for urban constituencies. Ex-
ports are a convenient source of fi s-
cal resources. In addition, the gov-
ernment has threatened to impose 
a price freeze on dairy products, 
effectively resulting in administered 
price controls. These tactics have 
been employed in other agricultural 
sectors, most notably in beef. Price 
controls on consumer products 
have ripple effects; processors are 
then forced to lower raw milk prices 
to offset their lost sales revenue. 
The negative impact of these disas-
trous policies is seen in Argentina’s 
country risk rating, which is among 
the worst in Latin America. Market 
access issues, mostly tariffs and 
TRQs, are the primary barriers to 
Argentine dairy exports. Argen-
tina exports milk powder to OPEC 
countries (Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and 
Nigeria) that tend to have relatively 
low duties on powder. For example, 
Algeria applied a 5 percent duty on 
milk powder products. Subsidized 
products, primarily from the Euro-
pean Union, have some negative 
impacts on Argentina’s potential 
foreign sales because Argentine ex-
ports compete with EU exports.
Chilean Dairy: Poised for Growth
Over the last two decades, the 
government of Chile has been com-
mitted to an open economy, which 
has led to extremely low tariffs by 
international standards, increasing 
competitiveness in export-orient-
ed and import-competing sectors 
and to signifi cant integration into 
world markets. As a result, Chilean 
agriculture has shown remarkable 
growth, both in terms of total value 
and productivity. The growth in ag-
ricultural exports is double that of 
the country’s GDP growth, approxi-
mately 10 to 12 percent annually. 
The central valleys of Chile, with 
their temperate conditions and dry 
summers, produce most of the high-
valued agricultural products. In the 
southern Los Lagos (10th) region, 
where roughly 70 percent of Chile’s 
milk is produced, the climate is 
wetter, supporting lush grasslands 
and pasture. However, the bulk of 
Chile’s population and demand for 
dairy products is further north in 
the Santiago area. Consequently, 
much of the milk produced in the 
south is processed for transport 
north as milk powder or shipped to 
export destinations. Only roughly 
half of the pasture resources in the 
10th region is currently used, so 
there is great potential for substan-
tial growth in dairy production.
Historically, Chile has been a 
small net importer of dairy prod-
ucts. In 2004, Chile became a net 
exporter of dairy products. While 
making this transition from import-
er to exporter, Chile’s dairy produc-
tion lost natural protection from 
tariffs and from the costs of interna-
tional transportation. A reduction 
in milk and dairy prices occurred in 
Los Lagos early in the decade, and 
milk production costs are now at 
levels that are competitive on world 
markets. Chile’s pursuit of free trade 
agreements has opened doors for its 
dairy industry in foreign markets. 
The country has become the largest 
exporter of hard cheeses to Mexi-
co, shipping roughly 18,000 metric 
tons of cheese annually under its 
preferential agreement. The agree-
ment with China in 2005 is expected 
to lead to an increase in China’s 
imports of Chilean whey powder in 
the near term and in cheese imports 
after fi ve years.
Chile’s 10th region shares many 
characteristics with the dairy areas 
in New Zealand. However, Chile’s 
dairy sector has been oriented to-
ward non-seasonal production for 
decades to provide a steady supply 
of milk and dairy products to San-
tiago and other population centers. 
If Chile is to expand its infl uence 
on international dairy markets, the 
dairy industry will need to embrace 
a more export-oriented approach 
to production and marketing. This 
will require investment so that 
dairy farms can upgrade to meet 
international quality standards. 
Chile currently lacks the fi nancial 
and support services necessary 
to modernize its dairy operations, 
particularly using seasonal pro-
duction, which is popular in New 
Zealand. Farmers fi nd it diffi cult to 
secure fi nancing for investments and 
for working capital. Likewise, the 
local insemination, veterinary, and 
contract labor systems needed for 
effi cient management of a seasonal 
dairy operation are not in place. 
Milk-processing capacity is near full 
utilization, and additional capac-
ity currently under construction 
is partially offset by the closure of 
a number of small cheese plants. 
In contrast to Argentina, Chile is 
a safe and profi table investment 
location and receives the best risk 
The signifi cant tariff cuts 
and elimination of export 
subsidies currently 
proposed in the Doha 
negotiations would 
create notable shortages 
in international dairy 
markets in the near term. 
Continued on page 10
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Agricultural Situation
Spotlight
Acreage Shifts Follow Price Signals
Figure 1. 2006 crop price movements since March 30, 2006
Chad E. Hart
chart@iastate.edu
515-294-9911
USDA recently released its fi rst planting estimates for the 2006 crops. Comparing these 
estimates to the planting intentions 
gathered in March of this year, corn 
acreage increased while soybean 
acreage declined. For corn, Iowa 
plantings rose by 200,000 acres and 
national acreage increased by 1.35 
million acres. Soybean plantings fell 
by 300,000 acres in Iowa and by 1.97 
million acres nationally. 
The difference between plant-
ing intentions and planted acre-
age was created by a combination 
of weather events and crop price 
movements. The March planting 
intentions showed that agricultural 
producers were concerned with the 
projections of higher input costs for 
fuels and fertilizers. That concern 
was backed up by their intention to 
plant more soybeans and less corn, 
a movement from a higher-input-in-
tensive crop to a lower-cost crop. 
The June planting report indicates 
farmers backtracked somewhat 
on this move. Weather conditions 
through April and May allowed 
planting to proceed at a brisk pace. 
This gave producers opportuni-
ties to put more corn in the ground 
than they expected. Also, as shown 
in Figure 1, crop price movements 
since the end of March have fa-
vored corn over soybeans. For the 
harvest futures contracts for 2006, 
corn prices have increased by 5 
percent while soybean prices have 
increased by 2 percent. These rela-
tively higher corn prices through-
out the planting season also provid-
ed incentives to producers to shift 
acreage back to corn.
Projections for 2006 and 2007 
Table 1 contains two sets of net 
return projections for corn and soy-
beans. The only differences between 
the two projections are projected 
harvest time prices. The trend yields 
are estimated from national yield 
data for 1980-2005. Harvest price 
projections are taken from the De-
cember 2006 corn and the November 
2006 soybean futures contracts. Vari-
able costs of production estimates 
are obtained from USDA’s Economic 
Research Service. Net return per 
acre is computed as the trend yield 
times the harvest price less the 
variable costs of production. As 
the table shows, based on March 
30 prices, corn held a slight advan-
tage over soybeans in net returns. 
Price movements since then have 
added to corn’s advantage, so that 
now corn net returns are projected 
to be $30 per acre over soybean net 
returns. Producers saw strong eco-
nomic incentives to back away from 
their March planting intentions and 
return acreage back to corn.
Looking forward to the 2007 
crop year, the current price signals 
are pointing even more strongly to 
corn. Figure 2 shows the relative 
changes in corn and soybean har-
vest futures prices for the 2007 crop 
year. Since March, the December 
2007 corn futures price has risen 
31¢ a bushel, an 11 percent increase. 
The November 2007 soybean futures 
price has risen 35¢ a bushel, a 5.5 
percent increase. These moves 
put December 2007 corn at over 
$3.00 a bushel and November 2007 
soybeans at $6.67 a bushel. To put 
these prices in perspective, let’s 
look at the 1990-2005 average fu-
tures prices for the December corn 
and November soybean contracts 
from mid-July, one and a half years 
before harvest. Corn prices aver-
aged $2.52/bushel while soybeans 
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Figure 2. 2007 crop price movements since March 30, 2006
Table 1. 2006 projections for yields, prices, and costs of production averaged $5.81/bushel. So both the 
corn and soybean prices going into 
2007 are well above average levels. 
In fact, over those 16 years, none 
of the corn prices exceeded $3.00 a 
bushel, and only in one year did the 
soybean price register above $6.67 
a bushel ($7.02 in July 1996 for the 
November 1997 soybean contract). 
But the corn price is 22 percent 
above average while the soybean 
price is 15 percent above average. 
Both prices indicate demand for 
more acreage of both crops, but the 
corn signal is stronger.
Table 2 shows projections for 
corn and soybean net returns based 
on trend yields, current futures pric-
es for 2007, and increased produc-
tion costs. For the variable costs 
of production, the 2007 value is the 
2006 value plus an upward adjust-
ment refl ecting the same percentage 
growth in costs as was experienced 
between 2005 and 2006. Corn’s pro-
jected net return gap over soybeans 
increases to $60 per acre. These 
projections indicate that we should 
expect to see increased corn acre-
age in 2007.
Drivers of Corn Demand
The strength of the corn and soy-
bean prices is somewhat surprising 
given the last two production years. 
For both corn and soybeans, the 
2004 crop year is the all-time record 
for production and the 2005 crop 
year is the second highest. So re-
cent production has not been lack-
ing. Corn stocks are up slightly from 
last year and soybean stocks are at 
record levels, up 42 percent from 
last year. So crop stocks are not low. 
Expected strong demand for the 
crops seems to be the driving fac-
tor behind the strength in corn and 
soybean prices.
Part of that demand is coming 
from the livestock sector. In the past 
two years, cattle and hog producers 
have made a lot of money, an eco-
nomic signal to expand their herds. 
Continued on page 11
Table 2. 2007 projections for yields, prices, and costs of production
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Can South America Pick Up the 
Soybean Slack?
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The astounding ramp-up in U.S. ethanol produc-tion means that acreage planted to corn in the United States will signifi cantly increase over the 
next fi ve years. The number one source of additional 
corn acres will be converted soybean acres. Other 
sources will be converted pasture, land taken out of the 
Conservation Reserve Program, and land taken out of 
other crops, primarily wheat. Chad Hart shows else-
where in this issue that the market is already signal-
ing farmers to convert soybean acres to corn acres. 
Decreased U.S. soybean acres means increased demand 
for substitutes for U.S. soybeans, which include soy-
beans from other countries and other oilseeds from the 
United States and elsewhere.
By far the largest supplier of substitutes for U.S. 
soybeans is South American soybean production. But 
South America production is seemingly less predictable 
now than it used to be. Figure 1 shows that the average 
yield in Argentina and Brazil in the last three years has 
been well below peak levels in 2000 and 2002. Drought, 
Asian soybean rust, and a slowdown in conversion of 
virgin lands have all worked to slow down yield growth. 
What is perhaps more surprising is that the number of 
hectares harvested in these two countries actually fell 
this year after showing a smaller-than-normal increase 
last year. Again, the impact of drought, as well as in-
creased production costs and relatively weak prices, is 
showing up in decreased harvested land.
The common assumption is that as more U.S. land 
is devoted to corn to produce ethanol, South America 
will continue to ramp up production to meet increased 
world demand for oilseeds. As shown in Figure 2, to-
gether, Brazil and Argentina have already surpassed the 
United States in soybean production. South America 
will need to continue to increase production signifi cant-
ly to offset declines in the United States as well as to 
meet projected growth in world demand for oilseeds.  
World soybean prices are likely to increase as U.S. 
acreage declines. This increase in price will induce 
more production in South America. The responsiveness 
of South American soybean production to this price in-
crease will determine how quickly the United States will 
shift to corn. Livestock feeders and consumers of corn 
and oilseeds worldwide have a large stake in seeing 
South America get back to its historical path of produc-
tion growth. ◆
Figure 1. Soybean yields and harvested area in 
South America
Figure 2. Soybean production in South America 
and the United States
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Over the last year, the most talked about agricultural topic has not been the state 
of Doha negotiations, what the next 
farm bill would include, or when 
Japan would completely open its 
market to U.S. beef exports. Rather, 
the focus has been on ethanol. A 
combination of Congress passing the 
Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 
high oil and natural gas prices, two 
consecutive years of low corn prices, 
a continuation of the tax credit for 
ethanol, and a phase-out of MTBE 
have created a frenzy of investment 
in ethanol plants and huge windfall 
profi ts for owners of existing plants. 
Investors are in such frenzy because 
they know that if they do not act 
quickly enough, all the corn surplus 
areas will be spoken for by someone 
else’s ethanol plant. 
The rapid expansion of bio-
fuels production will change U.S. 
agriculture over the next 10 years. 
The impacts will be felt across both 
crop and livestock sectors, as the 
market signals farmers that more 
corn is needed. We have (perhaps 
inadvertently) put in motion this 
change without much understanding 
of what it will mean. CARD research-
ers are increasingly being asked 
to supply answers to fundamental 
questions about the impacts of the 
biofuels boom on U.S. agriculture. 
What will it mean to U.S. agricul-
ture if Iowa no longer exports corn? 
Where will cattle feeders in Okla-
homa and Texas source their feed? 
Who will meet the world demand 
for corn imports? Can dairy, beef 
cattle, poultry, and swine rations 
be changed suffi ciently to use up 
all the by-products from ethanol 
production? Will the huge growth 
in by-products change where cattle 
Biorenewables Policy at CARD
are fed in the United States? What 
will happen to our ability to feed our 
livestock when we lose half a corn 
crop because of drought? What will 
be the impact on basis risk from the 
ethanol boom? What environmental 
impacts will follow from increased 
corn acreage? Will expansion of bio-
fuels production change the politi-
cal dynamic that has left the United 
States on the sideline of carbon mar-
kets? Will we soon be importing sub-
stantially more ethanol from Brazil? 
What impact will higher corn prices 
have on the 2007 farm bill? And, 
more fundamentally, will the United 
States really be better off if we de-
vote an increasing portion of our 
land base to producing crops that 
can be converted to liquid fuels?
CARD researchers have devoted 
considerable effort to understand-
ing the impacts of biofuels. Simla 
Tokgoz and Amani Elobeid created 
the fi rst international ethanol trade 
model to help estimate the impact 
on U.S. markets of overseas devel-
opments and to provide outlook 
information. The Resource and 
Environmental Policy Division has  
developed models to estimate the 
benefi ts to U.S. agriculture from 
participation in carbon markets and 
the impact of changing cropping pat-
terns on water quality. And many of 
us have written about the potential 
for synergistically combining crop 
production, livestock operations, 
and ethanol plants.
A new research division in CARD 
called Biorenewables Policy will en-
able us to answer the growing list 
of questions more systematically 
and to better position future CARD 
research efforts. The new research 
division will be led by Dr. Chad Hart. 
Chad has extensive knowledge of 
U.S. agriculture and farm policy so 
he is an ideal person to provide lead-
ership in this area. 
Chad will soon provide CARD’s 
Web site with a host of biofuels-re-
lated information, including updated 
maps that show all U.S. ethanol and 
biodiesel plants, including the feed-
stocks the plants use, the current 
production capacity of the plants, 
and any planned expansions in ca-
pacity. He will also provide updated 
information about biofuels operating 
margins relative to historical trends. 
Enhanced basis analysis for corn 
and soybeans is also on the horizon. 
We will soon roll out basis maps for 
the entire Corn Belt. 
Chad will have the overall 
responsibility of making sure that 
CARD’s quantitative models are 
capable of providing insight into the 
new questions that have arisen as 
U.S. agriculture adjusts to its new 
future as a supplier of both food and 
energy. ◆
Chad Hart will lead CARD’s
Biorenewables Policy Division
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ratings in Latin America. The pres-
ence of Nestlé and Fonterra in Chile 
may provide some of the fi nancial 
resources needed to promote a 
general increase in production scale 
and accelerate the rate of technol-
ogy adoption.
Our research suggests that the 
reduction of tariffs and elimination 
of subsidized dairy exports in a new 
WTO agreement will increase milk 
production in Argentina and Chile 
by 7 and 4 percent, respectively, 
over expected production under 
current policies. Argentine milk 
powder exports will increase by 
more than 20 percent, and cheese 
exports will rise more than 50 per-
cent. Similar impacts are projected 
for Chilean whole milk powder and 
cheese exports. However, the expan-
sion of Argentine dairy trade will be 
signifi cantly lower if the government 
does not eliminate its taxes on dairy 
exports.
International Prospects 
for U.S. Dairy Industries
These two case studies shed light 
on U.S. dairy prospects in global 
markets. The U.S. dairy industry 
combines most of the sources of 
competitiveness characterizing its 
two South American competitors: 
availability of inexpensive feed 
and land in many regions suitable 
for dairy production, high human 
capital, access to modern technol-
ogy, an effi cient processing sec-
tor, excellent transportation and 
communication infrastructures, low 
capital cost and credit risk, and a 
tradition in dairy production. So it 
is puzzling that the United States 
does not export more dairy prod-
ucts. The current U.S. dairy pro-
gram, with its price distortions and 
border impediments, obscures the 
international competitiveness of 
U.S. dairy and provides producers 
with incentives to cater to domes-
tic rather than to foreign markets. 
Reducing these domestic incen-
tives would force the U.S. dairy 
industry to turn outward, where it 
is well equipped to be internation-
ally competitive in world markets, 
especially if all countries reform 
their own distorting policies. ◆ 
Dairy in Argentina and Chile
Continued from page 5
expansion are not the most cost-
effi cient means of maintaining the 
status quo. 
All evidence suggests that high 
premium subsidies are needed to 
induce farmers to join the program. 
The overall cost of these subsidies 
could be reduced if the structure of 
premium subsidies was changed to 
decrease the incentive for farmers 
to buy the most expensive forms 
of crop insurance. We previously es-
timated that $300 million could be 
saved by such a move. 
Signifi cant savings could also be 
obtained by changing the way that 
A&O subsidies are determined. Most 
of these funds are captured by crop 
insurance agents. But given the grow-
ing familiarity of farmers with the 
program and the currently large mar-
ket penetration of insurance, do we 
need to continue to pay large com-
missions simply to maintain farmers 
in the program? One alternative is to 
pay a commission directly to those 
farmers who sign up for crop insur-
ance through the Internet or directly 
with RMA. Recent political battles be-
tween agents and innovative compa-
nies over premium reduction plans 
that allow farmers to capture a por-
tion of agent commissions indicates 
how diffi cult it would be to wean the 
industry away from the status quo of 
high commissions.
Considerable savings could 
also be obtained by making under-
writing gains and losses the sole 
responsibility of the federal govern-
ment. As illustrated here, the com-
pensation required to induce com-
panies to take on a small amount 
of risk (relative to the gains that 
they obtain) is large. We estimate 
that taxpayers would benefi t by an 
average of $435 million per year if 
USDA directly underwrote all risks 
from the crop insurance program. 
A potential downside from having 
the government underwrite all risk 
is that companies would lose the 
incentive they now have in their re-
tained business to prevent fraud. ◆ 
Crop Insurance
Continued from page 3
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Ag Spotlight–Acreage Shifts
Continued from page 7
Recent cattle inventory fi gures show 
that we may have entered an upturn 
in the U.S. cattle cycle, as cattle in-
ventories are running higher than in 
the previous two years. Quarterly in-
ventories of hogs are holding above 
60 million head, and breeding hog 
inventories are up from last year. 
The increase in livestock inventories 
translates into increased demand for 
feedstocks—corn and soybean meal.
Another segment of demand is 
the ethanol boom. Ethanol produc-
tion has more than doubled since 
2001. In 2005, over 3.9 billion gal-
lons of ethanol was produced in the 
United States. The vast majority of 
this ethanol was derived from corn. 
In 2001, 681 million bushels of corn 
were dedicated to ethanol produc-
tion. By 2005, that amount had grown 
to 1.43 billion bushels. The ethanol 
industry is poised to become the 
second-largest market segment for 
corn, trailing only livestock feed and 
surpassing exports.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
established a renewable fuels 
standard that grows from 4 billion 
gallons in 2006 to 7.5 billion gal-
lons in 2012. Ethanol is positioned 
as the fuel to meet this standard. 
Current production already exceeds 
the 2006 target. There are over 100 
ethanol plants currently in op-
eration. Several of these plants are 
expanding and over 30 more plants 
are in the planning and/or construc-
tion stages. Based on these plants 
alone, the ethanol industry could 
grow to 7 billion gallons within the 
next year and a half. 
Increased feed demand and 
increased ethanol demand trans-
late into higher expected futures 
prices for both corn and soybeans. 
The market wants more of both 
commodities, but there is a limited 
supply of acreage. Current market 
signals indicate that the market 
wants corn acres more than soy-
bean acres. If this trend continues, 
expect Iowa corn acreage to grow, 
Iowa soybean acreage to decline, 
and the proportion of Iowa acre-
age enrolled in the Conservation 
Reserve Program to shrink. ◆
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